Under the notable Issacs's condition on the Hamiltonian, the existence results of a saddle point are obtained for the stochastic recursive zero-sum differential game and mixed differential game problem, that is, the agents can also decide the optimal stopping time. The main tools are backward stochastic differential equations BSDEs and double-barrier reflected BSDEs. As the motivation and application background, when loan interest rate is higher than the deposit one, the American game option pricing problem can be formulated to stochastic recursive mixed zero-sum differential game problem. One example with explicit optimal solution of the saddle point is also given to illustrate the theoretical results.
Introduction
The nonlinear backward stochastic differential equations BSDEs in short had been introduced by Pardoux and Peng 1 , who proved the existence and uniqueness of adapted solutions under suitable assumptions. Independently, Duffie and Epstein 2 introduced BSDE from economic background. In 2 , they presented a stochastic differential recursive utility which is an extension of the standard additive utility with the instantaneous utility depending not only on the instantaneous consumption rate but also on the future utility. Actually, it corresponds to the solution of a particular BSDE whose generator does not depend on the variable Z. From mathematical point of view, the result in 1 is more general. Then, El Karoui et al. 3 and Cvitanic and Karatzas 4 generalized, respectively, the results to BSDEs with reflection at one barrier and two barriers upper and lower .
Stochastic Recursive Zero-Sum Differential Game
In this section, we will study the existence of the stochastic recursive zero-sum differential game problem using the result of BSDEs.
Let {B t , 0 ≤ t ≤ T } be an m-dimensional standard Brownian motion defined on a probability space Ω, F, P . Let F t t≥0 be the completed natural filtration of B t . Moreover, i C is the space of continuous functions from 0, T to R m ;
ii P is the σ-algebra on 0, T × Ω of F t -progressively sets;
iii for any stopping time ν, T ν is the set of F t -measurable stopping time τ such that P -a.s. ν ≤ τ ≤ T ; T 0 will simply be denoted by T;
iv H 2,k is the set of P-measurable processes ω ω t t≤T , R k -valued, and square integrable with respect to dt ⊗ dP; v S 2 is the set of P-measurable and continuous processes ω ω t t≤T , such that E sup t≤T |ω t | 2 < ∞.
The m × m matrix σ σ ij satisfies the following: i for any 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m, σ ij is progressively measurable;
ii for any t, x ∈ 0, T × C, the matrix σ t, x is invertible;
iii there exists a constants K such that |σ t,
Then, the equation
has a unique solution x t . Now, we consider a compact metric space A resp. B , and U resp. V is the space of P-measurable processes u : u t t≤T resp. v : v t t≤T with values in A resp. B . Let
iii there exists a constant K such that |Φ t, x, u, v | ≤ K 1 |x| t for any t, x, u, and v;
iv there exists a constant M such that |σ −1 t, x Φ t, x, u, v | ≤ M for any t, x, u, and v. x t t≤T is a weak solution.
Suppose that we have a system whose evolution is described by the process x t t≤T . On that system, two agents c 1 and c 2 intervene. A control action for c 1 resp. c 2 is a process 4 Mathematical Problems in Engineering u u t t≤T resp. v v t t≤T belonging to U resp. V . Thereby U resp. V is called the set of admissible controls for c 1 resp. c 2 . When c 1 and c 2 act with, respectively, u and v, the law of the dynamics of the system is the same as the one of x under P u,v . The two agents have no influence on the system, and they act to protect their advantages by means of u ∈ U and v ∈ V via the probability P u,v . In order to define the payoff, we introduce two functions C t, x, y, u, v and g x satisfying the following assumption: there exists L > 0, for all x, x ∈ H 2,m and Y, Y ∈ S 2 , such that
and g x is measurable, Lipschitz continuous function with respect to x. The payoff
where Y satisfies the following BSDE:
2.6
From the result in 10 , there exists a unique solution Y, Z for u, v. The agent c 1 wishes to minimize this payoff, and the agent c 2 wishes to maximize the same payoff. We investigate the existence of a saddle point for the game, more precisely a pair u
and we say that the Isaacs' condition holds if for t,
We suppose now that the Isaacs' condition is satisfied. By a selection theorem see Benes 11 , there exists u
Thanks to the assumption of σ, Φ, and C, the function 
2.12
We can get Y * 0 
2.13
By the comparison theorem of the BSDEs and the inequality 2.9 , we can compare the solutions of 2.11 , and 2.13 and 
Stochastic Recursive Mixed Zero-Sum Differential Game
Now, we study the stochastic recursive mixed zero-sum differential game problem. First, let us briefly describe the problem. Suppose now that we have a system, whose evolution also is described by x t 0≤t≤T , which has an effect on the wealth of two controllers C 1 and C 2 . On the other hand, the controllers have no influence on the system, and they act so as to protect their advantages, which are antagonistic, by means of u ∈ U for C 1 and v ∈ V for C 2 via the probability P u,v in 2.2 . The couple u, v ∈ U × V is called an admissible control for the game. Both controllers 6 Mathematical Problems in Engineering also have the possibility to stop controlling at τ for C 1 and θ for C 2 ; τ and θ are elements of T which is the class of all F t -stopping time. In such a case, the game stops. The controlling action is not free, and it corresponds to the actions of C 1 and C 2 . A payoff is described by the following BSDE: 
where the U t t≤T , L t t≤T , and Q t t≤T are processes of S 2 such that L t ≤ Q t ≤ U t . The action of C 1 is to minimize the payoff, and the action of C 2 is to maximize the payoff. Their terms can be understood as i C s, x, Y, u, v is the instantaneous reward for C 1 and cost for C 2 ;
ii U τ is the cost for C 1 and for C 2 if C 1 decides to stop first the game;
iii L θ is the reward for C 2 and cost for C 1 if C 2 decides stop first the game.
The problem is to find a saddle point strategy one should say a fair strategy for the controllers, that is, a strategy u * , τ * ; v * , θ * such that 
It is easy to know that H t, x, Y, Z, u, v is Lipschitz in Z and monotone in Y .
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From the result in 12 , the stochastic mixed zero-sum differential game problem is possibly connected with BSDEs with two reflecting barriers. Now, we give the main result of this section. 
3.6
Since 
3.7
We know that 
3.9
The payoff J x 0 , u * , τ * ; v, θ can be described by the solution of following BSDE: The proof is now completed.
Application
In this section, we present two examples to show the applications of Section 3. The first example is about the American game option pricing problem. We formulate it to be one stochastic recursive mixed game problem. This can be regarded as the application background of our stochastic game problem.
Example 4.1. American game option when loan interest is higher than deposit interest is shown.
In El Karoui et al. 13 , they proved that the price of an American option corresponds to the solution of a reflected BSDE. And Hamadène 9 proved that the price of American game option corresponds to the solution of a reflected BSDE with two barriers. Now, we will show that under some constraints in financial market such as when loan interest rate is higher than deposit interest rate, the price of an American game option corresponds to the value function of stochastic recursive mixed zero-sum differential game problem.
We suppose that the investor is allowed to borrow money at time t at an interest rate R t > r t , where r t is the bond rate. Then, the wealth of the investor satisfies 
